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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court concerning
same-gender harassment in the workplace has left employers scratching
their heads and plaintiffs' lawyers licking their chops. Oncale v.
* Ms. Ware is an associate in the Labor and Employment section of the Jacksonville office
of Foley & Lardner. She is a 1996 graduate of the University of Florida College of Law and former
Editor in Chief of the Florida Law Review.
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Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.1 also represents the Court's nearcomplete break with the language and original intent of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Despite Justice Scalia's plea that the case does
not establish a "general civility code," 3 the opinion is nothing less than
notice to employers that if employees behave badly enough, the federal
judiciary will take on the role of manners police.
Oncale is a virtual invitation to anyone who has been offended at the
office or job site by the bad behavior of a member of the same gender to
file a complaint in federal court despite alternative and more appropriate
legal remedies. Though an employee must still clear several legal hurdles
to get to a jury, Oncale lowers those hurdles to levels never imagined by
Title VII's framers and proponents. The old saw is that bad facts make bad
law. A review of Oncale'sbad facts, in light of Title VII's legislative and
interpretive decisional underpinnings, demonstrates Oncale is a perversion
of that portion of the Civil Rights Act.
I1. HISTORY OF TITLE VII
Congress added the prohibition of discrimination based on gender to
the civil rights legislation at the last moment.' Given its current impact,
one might expect that the addition was meant to strengthen the rights of
women. In fact, almost the opposite is true. The treatment of gender
discrimination was seen as so divisive that the language was added for the
purpose of preventing its passage.5 That effort failed, and the bill that
passed included language prohibiting discrimination based on gender.6
Other than the plain language of the statute, little is known of the intent
of the drafters.7 Unlike other portions of the statute, there is no legislative

1. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-e (1994).
3. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
4. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,63 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 25772584 (1964)).
5. See Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.8, Oncale (No. 96-568).
6. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.
7. See id. While politically incorrect today, there is little doubt Title VU was enacted to
protect women and minorities from subjugation to men. See Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment:Subverting the HeterosexistParadigmof Title VII, 7 YALE J.L. &FMINISM 375, 37980 (1995). Laws passed by Congress around the same time as Title VII areinstructive. For example,
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,42
U.S.C. § 2000 (1994), and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994), cover women
and religious minorities. The Glass Ceiling Commission of 1991 was created to analyze
opportunities of women and minorities' executive positions. See Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub.
L. 102-166, § 202(b), 203(a) 105 Stat. 1081. The language in Meritorisa natural outgrowth of the
stated purpose of Title VII in that male-on-female sexual harassment comports with the legislators'
intent to protect women in the workplace. The same is not true of male-on-male situations.
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history to provide any interpretative guidance in the area of sexual or
gender-based discrimination.' As a result, the EEOC had a virtually free
hand9 in crafting guidelines as to what constitutes discrimination based on
sex.

The plain language of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment,practice for an employer
...to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.'0
The statute does not define the term "discriminate.""1
A reading of the statute does not make it clear that discrimination based
on sex may take the form of harassment.2 The prohibition of sexual
harassment stems from judicial interpretation of Title VII and has its roots
in the EEOC guidelines concerning gender discrimination. 13 The now
familiar definition in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 states:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of
title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 4
8. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.
9. Prior to the instant case, the United States Supreme Court had decided only three sexual
harassment cases. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (finding employment setting
"permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult' violates Title VII even if the
victim has suffered no psychological damage) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (extending Meritor to public schools);
Meritor,477 U.S. 57 (finding on-the-job sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
11. See id.
12. See Grose, supra note 7, at 377. It is a large leap in logic to conclude that Title VII's
enactors envisioned the statute as protecting against same-gender harassment,particularly when
the statute as enacted did not mention harassment. See § 2000e-2.
13. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997).
14. § 1604.1 l(a) (footnote omitted). A footnote indicates that these principles also apply to
race, color, religion, or national origin. See § 1604.11 n.1. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(b) states that:
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This regulation describes three scenarios under which sexual
harassment would be actionable based on Title VII. The first two
possibilities are related. Title VII prohibits sexual harassment when
submission is a condition of employment or when the submission to or
rejection of such behavior is a factor in an employment decision.' 5 The
very nature of the descriptions used-submission to or rejection of sexual
advances or requests for sexual favors-clearly assumes an interaction
based on sexual attraction or desire.' 6 Harassment falling into these two
categories is commonly referred to as "quidproquo."'7
It is critical to note that these EEOC definitions do not rely on the plain
language of Title VII, which itself refers only to discrimination. Black's
Law Dictionary defines discrimination (referencing constitutional law) as
"the effect of a statute or established practice which confers particular
privileges on a class. ' ' s Discrimination, in its most universal meaning,
means to distinguish or to differentiate. Recently, discrimination has
become short-hand for illegal discrimination. We all, however,
discriminate constantly and from an early age. We choose between things
we like and dislike; we discriminate by choosing a favorite movie, rock
star, or food. Discrimination is not necessarily a bad thing. It was not so
long ago that describing a person as discriminating meant he had good
judgment or superior taste. In the case of employment, the law only
prohibits certain types of discrimination. Distinguishing between
individuals based on sex, race, color, age, national origin, or religion is

Ethnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an individual's
national origin constitute harassment when this conduct:
(1) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
working environment;
(2) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance; or
(3) Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.

§ 1606.8(b).
15. See § 1604.11(a).
16. When a man touches a women in a sexually-suggestive way, it can be presumed he is
doing it "because of her gender." See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998,
1002 (1998). This presumption is not necessarily valid in same-gender actions, particularly when
there are no members of the opposite gender against which the allegedly offensive behavior can be
measured. See Grose, supra note 7, at 382. Without this frame of reference, and with an
acknowledgment of more traditional notions of heterosexuality, a plaintiffeannot prove the conduct
is "because of gender." See id. at 393.
17. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 65.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss3/3

4

Ware: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: Perverted Behavior L
ONCAIE V. SUNDOWNER.- PERVERSERULING

prohibited.19 Distinguishing between individuals based on other
characteristics, for example, attendance records, seniority, or performance,
is permitted.
The third possibility described in the EEOC regulation refers to what
is commonly known as "hostile work environment." The Supreme Court
first recognized hostile work environment as a violation of Title VII in
MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson.21 In Meritor,Vinson claimed that during
her employment, her supervisor requested sexual favors, fondled her, and
even raped her.' Her supervisor categorically denied these allegations.'
The district court did not determine whether there was a sexual
relationship, but denied relief finding that if a sexual relationship did exist,
it was voluntary.' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed and remanded.'
As the language quoted below indicates, the MeritorCourt presumed
discrimination was present. The Meritor Court quoted with approval
language from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive [work]
environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a
man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets.
Critically, the Court's language in Meritor refers to discrimination even
though the word "discrimination" (or its derivatives) is not found in the
EEOC guidelines. 27
In deciding Meritor, the Supreme Court reviewed the history and

19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (1994). State or local laws may protect additional
characteristics.
20. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 65-66.
21. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
22. See id. at 60.
23. See id. at 61.
24. See id. Meritor is also the first Supreme Court case to recognize the distinction between
voluntary and welcome behavior. See id. at 68 (stating that although the relationship was voluntary,
the advances could have been unwelcome).
25. See id. at 63.
26. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,902 (lth Cir. 1982)).
27. Even Meitor requires proof that the harassment is "because of gender" for it to be
actionable. See id. Without that requirement, Title VII would be transformed into a tort statute
aimed at eradicating unwelcome sexuality or sexually based comments in the work place.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 3
494

FLORIDA LAW REVLEW

[VOL 51

development of hostile work environment claims.2 8 The Court
characterized the EEOC precedent as concluding that "Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult."2 9 After discussing lower court decisions
which relied on the EEOC principles, the Court concluded, "Nothing in
Title VII suggests that a hostile work environment based on discriminatory
30
sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited.,
Following Meritor, the Court recognized a hostile work environment
claim in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc. 31 In that case, Teresa Harris was
a manager for Forklift Systems and complained about discriminatory
treatment from the company's President, Charles Hardy.32 This treatment
included derogatory remarks about women 33 and behavior directed at
Harris and other female employees.34 Specifically, the magistrate judge
found that "Hardy often insulted [Harris] because of her gender" but then
concluded the conduct did not rise "to the level of interfering with
[Harris's] work performance."35
In concluding that Harris's claim was actionable, the Supreme Court
relied on Meritorand again used language which included discrimination.36
"A discriminatorily abusive work environment.., can and often will
detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. 37 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated, "The critical issue, Title
VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of
3
the other sex are not exposed., 1
1II. ONcALE: THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

It is precisely this reliance on the presence of discriminationthat is
lacking from the Court's opinion in Oncale.39 At oral argument both sides
28. See id.
at 65-67.
29.
30.
31.
32.

l at 65 (citations omitted).
Id.at 66.
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
See id.at 19.

33. These included "You're a woman, what do you know?" and "We need a man as the rental
manager." Id.
34. See iL
35. Il at 19-20.
36. See id at 21-23.
37. Id.at 22.
38. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
39. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 998.
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were repeatedly asked how the facts in this case showed discrimination.'
Despite this questioning, Justice Scalia tried to evade the issue by saying
that sexual harassment discrimination is not dependent on the presence of
sexual attraction. 1 While this statement is correct, it is woefully inadequate
to address how the facts in Oncale meet the plain language requirements
of Title VII.
A. The Facts
Joseph Oncale was working as a roustabout for Sundowner on an oil
platform off the coast of Louisiana in October of 1991.42 He was one of
eight men in that location.43 There were no women on the platform.' It was
Oncale's bad luck to be in a crew which included John Lyons (a crane
operator), Danny Pippen (a driller) and Brandon Johnson (a crew
member).45 Lyons and Pippen were supervisors.46 Under any standards of
decent society, these supervisors behaved abysmally by subjecting the
plaintiff to degrading and humiliating threats and behavior of a sexual
nature. As the case was decided on the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at the trial level, Oncale's allegations must be accepted as
genuine.48
Specifically, Oncale alleged that on October 25, 1991, Pippen grabbed
and held him as Lyons removed his (Lyons') penis from his pants and
placed it on the back of Oncale's head.49 Though Oncale struggled against
the attack, Lyons indicated he was going to "fuck [Oncale] in the
behind."5 The entire crew witnessed the incident.5 And that was just the
beginning.
The next morning, as the crew was being lifted from a boat onto the
work platform, Johnson restrained Oncale as Lyons again exposed himself,
placed his penis on Oncale's arm and assured the Plaintiff he had more

40. See Transcript of Oral Arguments at 9, 12, 18, Oncale (No. 96-568).
41. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.

42. See id. at 1000.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id.at 1000-01.
See id.
See id. at 1001.
See id

47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, Oncale (No. 96-568).

50. ld.
51. See id.
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intimate acts in mind.52 Later that day, as Oncale was showering, Lyons
and Pippen got in the shower stall with him, and Pippen again restrained
Oncale as Lyons placed a bar of soap between "the cheeks of his
(Oncale's) behind" and informed Oncale yet again that the two were going
to "fuck (Oncale) in the behind.' 53 It was uncontroverted that Pippen and
Lyons had the authority to direct and control Oncale's employment.5 "
In response, Oncale reported the horrendous conduct to, among others,
Sundowner's Safety Compliance Clerk. 5 Incredibly, the Compliance Clerk
indicated Pippen and Lyons "'picked [on] him' [also] and called him a
name suggesting homosexuality." ' 6 No remedial action was taken, and
Oncale eventually resigned his position in November of 1991, indicating
he was forced to quit out of fear he would be "raped or forced to have
sex. 5 7 Oncale's termination paperwork indicated he voluntarily left "due
58
.
to sexual harassment and verbal abuse.
Oncale brought suit in the Federal District Court in the Eastern District
of Louisiana on May 4, 1994, against Sundowner, Lyons, and Pippen,
alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5' He
claimed he was discriminated against in his employment because of his
gender.6' The Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on
the Fifth Circuit's prior prohibition of same-sex harassment claims in
Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America.61 The district court granted
defendant's motion.62 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.63
B. The Respective Theories
Throughout the appellate process, Oncale argued Garciawas simply
wrong and that the language and interpretation of Title VII did not exclude

52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000-01.
55. See id.at 1001.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Oncale (No. 96-568).
59. See Oncale, 118 S. CL at 1001.
60. See id.
61. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); see Brief for Petitioner at 2, Oncale (No. 96-568)
(discussing the Garciadecision, which failed to recognize a claim under Title VII for same-sex

sexual harassment).
62. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
63. See id.
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same-gender harassment claims." Oncale relied on precedent from other
circuits allowing such claims.' He also cited decisions in which the
Supreme Court rejected a conclusive presumption that employers would
not discriminate against other members of the same group.' Additionally,
Oncale argued that the applicable portion of Title VII placed no
prohibitions on same-gender claims.'
Because Congress used the term "sex" instead of "member of the
opposite sex," and "race" as opposed to a separate race, Oncale argued
Garciawas unsupportable and that the prohibition against same-sex Title
VII claims should be lifted in the Fifth Circuit.' In view of the relatively
scant legislative history, Oncale further argued the Fifth Circuit's
affirmance was neither compelled nor supported by the plain language,
legislative history, or jurisprudential interpretation of Title VII.69 Citing
Meritor,Oncale argued the gravamen of sexual harassment claims was that
the conduct was "unwelcome."70 He cited the EEOC guidelines defining
"sexual harassment" as additional support.71 Since submission to the
ongoing barbarous acts of Lyons, Pippen, and Johnson became a condition
of his continued employment, Oncale argued those actions altered the
conditions of his job so as to create a "sexually intimidating and offensive
work environment" in violation of Title VI.7z Because Oncale was a
married, heterosexual father of two, his lawyers argued Oncale's harassers'
actions were particularly reprehensible.73 More specifically, they were
harassing because Oncale was a man, thus satisfying the gender causation
component of Title VII Oncale's lawyers also emphasized the evolution
of the standard for measuring offensiveness, eventually arriving at the
gender-neutral test of the "reasonable person" which would obviously
include males.75
Not surprisingly, Sundowner took a diametrically opposed approach
throughout the appeal. Put simply, Sundowner contended there was never

64. See Brief for Petitionerpassim, Oncale (No. 96-568).

at 10 n.7 (citing cases).
65. See id.
66. See id at 24 n.24.

at 25-26.
67. See id.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 10.
See id. at 11-14.
See id. at 27-30.
See idat 16.
Id at 17.
See id. at 19.

74. See id.
75. See id. at 19-22.
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an occasion on which it would be proper for a court to find a cause of
action under Title VII in same-gender situations.76 Sundowner traced the
evolution of that statute from its intended purpose to protect women and
minorities, through an impermissible judicial expansion to include
"harassment" as a form of "discrimination," and finally to a situation in
which the requirement that gender be a motivating factor in finding
liability is ignored and replaced by a standard where any offensive
language could be used as a basis for a Title VII claim." Sundowner also
distinguished other circuit decisions which, unlike the Fifth Circuit, have
allowed same-gender suits.7"
As an alternative to Title VII liability, Sundowner discussed samegender hazing and the need for Congress to address such situations with
legislation aimed at bringing a same-sex workplace misconduct matter
within the legislative ambit of Title VII. 9 From a practical/analytical
standpoint, Sundowner also argued that the facts in Oncale would not
allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude the bad behavior was motivated
by gender since there were no women on the platform and other males also
had been treated badly by Lyons, Pippen, and Johnson."° Essentially,
because there was no sexual frame of reference (i.e., women subjected to
different treatment), there was no way to conclude Oncale was targeted for
his gender as opposed to some other reason. Sundowner concluded that
allowing Oncale to proceed would eliminate the gender-causation
requirement of the statute, thereby unmooring it from its plain language
and transforming it into a general "workplace tort statute.""
C. The Analytical Framework
At this point, it is particularly important to recall the procedural history
of Oncale. The case came before the Supreme Court because the
employer's motion for summary judgment had been granted. 2 Unlike a
review based on a motion to dismiss, in order to withstand a motion for

76. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Oncale (No. 96-568). Sundowner's lawyers in Oncale
simply argued that members of the same gender cannot sexually harass each other in such a manner
as to constitute "discrimination" because of gender as intended by Title VII's enactors. See id. at
8-10.
77. See id. at 16-22.

78. See id. at 15.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.at 16-22.
See id.
at 37-38.
Id. at 44.
See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000.
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summary judgment, the non-moving party must show that sufficient issues
of material fact exist.8 3 In contrast, a court granting a motion to dismiss
must find that there are no facts which could be proven to support a finding
of liability." The distinction here is critical. It is the difference between
deciding whether there can ever be a claim for same-sex harassment (the
question posed by a motion to dismiss) or whether the facts in this case
support a claim for same-sex harassment (the question posed by a motion
for summary judgment).
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Justice Scalia's OverreachingLanguage
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, 5 tried to have it both
ways. That is, while the Court attempted to avoid implying that simple bad
manners around the office could give rise to federal liability, it also missed
the opportunity to realign the current law with the original intent of Title
VII.
Although the Oncale case will be widely cited for the proposition that
Title VII prohibits same-sex discrimination, its most important value
comes from what it fails to do. To prove a violation of Title VII, a plaintiff
must show discrimination based on gender.8 6 The opinion fails to address
how Oncale can possibly show discrimination in an all-male environment.
To survive a motion for summary judgment there must be material facts in
dispute.87 Without females in the work environment, how could Oncale
prove different treatment based on gender? Significantly, the briefs do not
argue whether there is a factual dispute about discrimination.
Citing Meritor, the Oncale court noted that Title VII "evinc[ed] a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women in employment." 8 The Court noted that when a

83. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
84. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). In arguing to the Supreme Court, Oncale
characterized the procedural posture as follows: "The court below found that no facts were material.
The court below did not review the facts and determine which facts of the alleged harassing
situation were material. They didn't decide this case as a matter of fact. They decided this case as
a matter of law." Transcript of Oral Arguments at 6, Oncale (No. 96-568).
85. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000.
86. See id. at 1001-02.
87. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
88. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986)).
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"workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII
is violated."' 9 The Court also noted that the discrimination had to be
"because of" gender.90
Noting that "hostile environment" claims are necessarily "bewildering,"
Justice Scalia referenced the hodgepodge of lower court opinions
concerning same sex harassment. 1 The Oncalecourt specifically rejected
the notion that same-gender actions must be motivated by sexual desire or
orientation.' Because Title Vllprohibits discrimination because of sex, the
Oncale court found the proscribed harassment must extend to interactions
between members of the same sex regardless of the gender and/or sexual
orientation of the participants. 93 That noted, Justice Scalia then attempted
to explain the holding in response to anticipated criticism from employers
that Oncalewould transform Title VII into a "general civility code" for the
American workplace.' He pointed out in very general terms that Title VII
does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace, only
discrimination based on sex. 5 Justice Scalia noted that in opposite-gender
cases, courts and juries have found the "inference of discrimination easy
to draw" because the conduct typically involved explicit or implicit
requests for sexual activity. 96 But not everything is harassment under the
Oncale Court's reasoning.
In what is quickly becoming one of the more famous examples in
Supreme Court history, Justice Scalia wrote that a professional football
coach who "smacks [his player] on the buttocks as he heads onto the field"
would not be deemed a sexual harasser due to the workplace environment;
however, this would not be the case for a boss who does the same thing in
an office environment.' The reasoning is that the "constellation of
surrounding circumstances" necessarily affects what is acceptable or
unacceptable workplace behavior. 8 "Common sense" and a sensitivity to
the "social context" will enable courts, according to Justice Scalia, to

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1001 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 1002.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1003.

98. Id.
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distinguish between "simple teasing or roughhousing among members of
the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
position would find severely hostile or abusive.""
In further rebuttal to anticipated commentators who would say Oncale
represents a general civility code, Justice Scalia reasoned that Title VII was
not designed to eliminate "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways
men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of
the opposite sex."" Since avoiding sexual harassment does not require
either "asexuality nor androgyny," Justice Scalia wrote that Title VII
prohibited only behavior that was so "objectively offensive" as to alter the
01
conditions of the victim's employment.
In what is offered as an aside to the opinion, Justice Scalia brushes right
by Oncale's fatal flaw. The Oncale court correctly pointed out that
members of one definable group are not above discriminating against other
members of the same group." For example, a female victim may be
harassed in gender-specific and derogatory ways by another woman in her
workplace who is motivated by general dislike of other women on the
job. 3 By way of proof, Justice Scalia pointed out that the same-sex
harassment plaintiff could prove such improper activity by offering "direct
comparative evidence" about how the alleged harasser treated members of
both sexes in order to prove the inference that the derogatory language was
based on gender."° While that reasoning is sound, it is that specific lack of
factual underpinnings in Oncale which is the opinion's Achilles' heel.
Additionally, Justice Scalia's multiple efforts to portray Oncale as
something other than a general civility code are completely gutted by his
own use of an objective standard not dependent on different behavior
toward the sexes. It is this evidentiary and logistical flaw which renders
this latest decision the unrecognizable progeny of Title VII.
B. The EvidentiaryFlaw
Nowhere in Oncale is there an argument that females were treated
differently. In fact, this is clearly an impossible argument to make. The oil

99. Id.
100. Il at 1002-03.
101. Id. at 1003.
102. See id. at 1001-02. In Castanedav. Partida,430 U.S. 482,499 (1987), the Supreme
Court found that members of a class can discriminate against each other.
103. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
104. Id.
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rig had an unusual work environment-it was all male.105 By definition,
this all-male environment poses an analytical problem for Oncale. How can
he show discrimination because of gender in an environment with only one
gender?
Implicitly, Oncale argued that showing different treatment towards
males and females was not required."' 6 Oncale's brief states, "When an
individual of either gender reasonably perceives that he must abandon his
employment to escape unwelcome sexual harassment and verbal and
physical sexual assault, he is the victim of employment discrimination
based on sex as proscribed by Title VII.'1 ' 7 Notice the leap. No longer is
proof of discrimination required. Rather, when an employee is subjected
to offensive behavior of a sexual nature, discrimination is presumed.
Despite its protests, this is exactly the conclusion of the Supreme Court. In
quoting Meritor,Oncale excluded language which relies on the presence
of discrimination. Consider this statement, where Oncale cited to Meritor
for authority: "The sexual harassment proscribed includes both hostile or
abusive environment claims as well as sexual conduct or activity which is
directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quidpro quo."'0 8
By determining that Title VII did allow claims of same-gender
harassment (even if not sexually motivated) the Court ignored the
underlying facts-Oncale worked in a single-gender environment."9 The
Court repeatedly pays homage to the fact that the statutory language
actually requires discrimination; that is, some evidence the complained of
action was because of gender."' What the Court does not do is explain
how discrimination because of gender can be proven in an all-male
environment."'
Justice Scalia opens the opinion by stating, "This case presents the

105. See id at 1001-02.
106. See generallyBrieffor Petitioner,Oncale (No. 96-568) (explaining Oncale's harassment
in the context of both genders).
107. Id. at 6-7.
108. Id. at 8-9.

109. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
110. See id Removing the "because of gender" requirement from the Title VII analysis
transforms the statute into a general work place rule prohibiting any sexually-suggestive language
or behavior.
111. Male-on-male sexual harassment with sexual overtones is not sex discrimination "absent
a showing that the employer treated the plaintiff differently because of his gender." See Giddens
v. Shell Oil, 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993). It is this lack of the plaintiff's ability in Oncale to show
he was treated differently than other employees which is fatal to his claim. This is compounded by
the fact that other members of the offshore crew were subjected to similar degrading behavior
which, while socially reprehensible, does not violate Title VII. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
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question whether workplace harassment can violate Title VII's prohibition
against 'discriminat[ion] ...
because of... sex' ... when the harasser and
the harassed employee are of the same sex. 112 The Court answered the
question resoundingly-there can be same-sex harassment-but failed to
discuss evidence in this case that could be used to show discrimination.1 13
There is only one problem. There is no proof of discrimination because of
gender in a single-gender environment.1 4
The Oncale Court stated that the prohibition against discrimination
protects both men and women." 5 The Court could have stopped
there-recognizing the possibility or validity of same-sex discrimination,
but finding no violation in this case because of a lack of evidence showing
discrimination. The Oncale Court also could have recognized that samesex harassment was valid while limiting its holding to the facts (or similar
cases), stating that in a single-gender work environment, objectively
offensive behavior of a sexual nature can serve as proof of discrimination
if it sufficiently exceeds accepted behavior in the societal context.
Instead, the Oncale Court stated that there are several ways the plaintiff
can prove a violation occurred.' 1 6 Justice Scalia wrote that an inference of
discrimination is "easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment
situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or
implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those
proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex."'1 7
Another avenue of proof available to the plaintiff which follows the same
analytical path is to show the harasser was a homosexual."' In both
instances the violation is based on a presumption of sexual desire. Neither
of these avenues were open to Oncale as both Oncale and his harassers

112. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1) (1994)).
113. See id. at 1003.
114. When courts rely on the sexual orientation of the harasser in same-gender cases, they
disregard the language of the statute which deals only with "sex" as opposed to sexual orientation.
See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus., 107 F.3d 443,448 (6th Cir. 1997). The United States Congress has
had ample opportunity to legislate against discrimination or harassment based on sexual orientation,
but it has refused to do so. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Congress has not enacted legislation despite "repeated attempts" to extend
federal civil rights laws to gays and lesbians). Additionally, the Senate rejected the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, Senate Bill 2238, 103d Cong. (1994). Therefore, no matter how
socially reprehensible or politically incorrect, without state or local legislative prescriptions,
discrimination against an individual because ofhis or her homosexuality does not violate Title VII.
115. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
116. Seeid. at 1002.
117. id
118. See id.
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were heterosexual." 9
The Court continued to provide other options for proving a violation
that did not rest on sexual attraction. For example, the Court hypothesized
about a woman who did not like to work with other women in the
workplace and "is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women
in the workplace."'120 This, however, is a difference in motivation, not in
the proof required. Relying on this as a separate avenue, distinct from
sexual attraction, the opinion goes on to say: "A same-sex harassment
plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparativeevidence about how
the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
workplace."'' Again, this was not an option available to Oncale. What's
left? A violation of Title VII based on sexual conduct in a same-sex
environment that is discriminatory solely because it is so far outside the
bounds of accepted societal conduct. In other words, the dreaded
2

conclusion-a civility code!1 1

C. Oncale Is a Civility Code
Previously, many courts have held that the purpose of Title VII is not
to eliminate all offensive behavior from the workplace." Rather, Title VII
has the limited purpose of eliminating discrimination based on race,
national origin, color, gender, or religion.'24 In Oncale, the Court has
equated discrimination with behavior that exceeds the bounds of social
119. See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Oncale (No. 96-568).
120. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. According to the Petitioner's brief, the claim was actionable because the "conduct was
sexual in nature, offensive, [and] unwelcome." Brief for Petitioner at 7, Oncale (No. 96-568).
Discrimination is not mentioned. Petitioner argued that the alleged conduct was repulsive and
offensive because Oncale was a man. Id. at 18-19. Yet, the Petitioner gracefully glossed over the
fact that having a male co-worker place his penis on a woman's head, would clearly be repulsive
and offensive.
123. No employer can purge the workplace of all comments that are offensive-or even of all
comments that imply substantive violations of Title VII. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797
F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir. 1986). Justice Scalia noted that men and women often deal with each
other in different ways. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. Without citation to statutory or decisional
authority, but with a nod towards common sense, it seems obvious that outlawing all rough
language, horseplay, and other socially questionable interaction between men would swamp
genuine Title VII claims in a sea of cases about bad manners. This is not to say that "boys will be
boys," but it is an acknowledgment that not all men are gentlemen, particularly to each other.
124. In cases involving same-gender harassment by heterosexuals, courts and commentators
often confuse "sex" with "sexual orientation," the latter of which is not prescribed by Title VII as
a basis for discrimination. Again, this may be socially unpalatable, but it is not against the law
under this statute.
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context and is offensive.' 25 Arguably, Title VII has been expanded to
punish the equal opportunity harasser.
Despite the authors' interpretation that Oncale does promote a civility
code in the workplace, there is good news for employers. First of all, the
Court's language emphasizes that not all sexual conduct is actionable
under Title VII. In order to create a hostile working environment the Court
quoted language stating that the conduct must be severe and pervasive as
judged by a "reasonable person."'" While this merely reemphasized the
old standard, the Court raised the bar by clearly stating that "ordinary
socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or
intersexual flirtation" does not amount to a discriminatory condition of
employment. 27 The Court elevated the standard another notch by drawing
attention to the social context--distinguishing between a pristine office
work environment and a rougher, more playful sports setting. 128 The ability
to focus on the expectations of those in the environment should be a boon
for employers.
This appears to be holding true. Shortly after Oncale was decided, the
majority of courts citing to it rendered decisions favorable to employers.129
Lower courts continue to require proof of discrimination and have cited
Oncale for the standard of a hostile work environment. 3 ' In Brennan v.

125. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03. Men harass other men for many reasons, almost all
of which have nothing to do with gender. For example, if the same louts involved in Oncale
ridiculed the plaintiff because he supported one football team or another or because he voted for
one political party versus another, there would surely not have been any violations of Title VII.
Therefore, this leaves only the sexual content of the behavior to differentiate it from the sexuallyneutral examples above. With that said, the Oncale Court necessarily turned Title VII into a work
place behavior code, particularly in instances in which either words or conduct concern sex acts.
It is that emasculation of Title VlI's "because of gender" requirement that turns Oncale into the
standard bearer for Title VII as a work place conduct code. Additionally, because Justice Scalia did
not limit the subject holding to sexually-charged language and behavior, Title VII can now be
interpreted even more broadly to include males razzing other males because of their choice of
football team or political party if the same language is not directed to women in the work place.
126. Id. at 1001 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993)).
127. Il at 1003.
128. See id.
129. As of April 27, 1998, 18 federal court cases have cited to the Oncale decision. Four of
these gave Oncalecursory treatment, citing it for its most basic proposition-that Title VII permits
a same-gender harassment suit. One case concerned removal, not employment discrimination. Ten
of the remaining thirteen cases resulted in a decision at least partially favorable to employers. Seven
of those were complete victories for employers. One case was remanded to the trial court, citing
Oncale for the societal context language.
130. See, e.g., Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, No. 95 CIV. 2926(MBM), 1998 WL
193204, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1998) (stating that the main issue in sexual harassment cases is
whether plaintiff is a member of a protected class).
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Metropolitan OperaAss'n, the trial court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, citing Oncale to support its statement that "the plaintiff
must show that she experienced the hostility because of her membership
in a protected class and not because the environment was generally hostile
to everyone, including people outside the protected class." '
In Reyes v. McDonald Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc.,3 ' the trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant even though a coworker had
' The district court cited Oncale to support
called the plaintiff a "bitch."133
the proposition that words with several connotations do not automatically
constitute discrimination." 34 The court went further stating, "Sometimes
words of frustration and anger are only meant in that spirit."' 35
In Gallant v. Board of Trustees,'36 the trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant despite the fact that plaintiff was subject to
"objectionable and unprofessional" conduct. 37 The court cited Oncale to
support the proposition that the conduct must be because of gender.'
"Plaintiff has produced no evidence.., that [the alleged harasser] would
not have acted in exactly the same way to a student or prospective student
' These decisions are at least initial evidence
who happened to be male."139
that Justice Scalia has not opened the doors to a flood of new proemployee litigation. However, they do not, retroactively, cure the opinion's
flawed reasoning. They also are not sufficiently similar to another line of
cases in which intra-group claims are proper under the law.
V. SAME-RAcE CASES
In Oncale,Justice Scalia alluded to earlier decisions in which the Court
rejected defense contentions that members of the same protected class
would not discriminate against each other. " While such decisions do exist
and are supportable under Title VII, they do not lead to the conclusions that
same-gender harassment is actionable. Initially, racial claims were
intended by Title VI's framers to be covered along with the protection of

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at *13.
997 F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1998).
U at 617.
See id.
Id.
997 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
Id. at 1235.
See id. at 1234.
Id. at 1235.
See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-03.
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women.14 ' Accordingly, there is no bootstrapping of adjunct claims like
sexual harassment to sexual discrimination as was done in Meritor. Put
simply, discrimination based on race was a direct target of Title VII from
its inception.
Also, and just as importantly, reported decisions dealing with same-race
discrimination are decided in the context of mixed-race employment
environments. That is, unlike Oncale, in which there were no women on
the oil rig,'42 a typical same-race discrimination case is situated so the
factfinder can compare how, for example, an African-American supervisor
treats an African-American subordinate in comparison to how she treats a
white subordinate. Without that context, there is no logical, rational, or
legal way to conclude whether the discrimination was based on an illegal
factor (race) or a legal factor (personality, dress, attitude, etc.).
Similar reasoning (or lack thereof), is found in cases involving maleon-male hazing. 43 Quite often such practices border on barbarism and
involve behavior of an arguably sexual nature. Greasing, shaving or
otherwise calling attention to male genitalia is standard fare in fraternity
houses and some employment settings around the country. 44 Like the
Sundowner platform, the behavior is not predicated on gender in the way
Title VII's drafters envisioned. 45 Such actions may be illegal, but the
proper means of redress is not Title VII.
VI. MORE APPROPRIATE THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Louisiana, like all states, has both criminal and tort statutes and theories
which would have been more appropriate to address the reprehensible
Sundowner supervisors and their employer. " In all likelihood, Oncale was
the victim of a criminal offense. On the civil side, he could have sought
recompense for battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress
against the individual defendants. Similarly, a negligent hiring and
retention claim could have been brought against Sundowner for what the
plaintiff experienced. Punitive damages may have been a real possibility

141. See id. at 1001.
142. See id.
143. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996); McWilliams v. Fairfax
County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogatedby Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 998;
Skinner v. City of Miami, 62 F.3d 344 (1 th Cir. 1995); Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d
922 (5th Cir. 1982).
144. See cases cited, supra note 143.
145. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct at 1001.
146. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.1 (West 1998); LA. CIr. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1998).
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against the employer, particularly after Oncale complained and was not
given any help while on the rig. 47 So Oncale, a man who experienced
hideous treatment at the hands of deranged supervisors and with the (at
least) casual approval of an indifferent employer, would not have been left
without a means of redress if the Oncale Court had properly ruled Title VII
did not apply. The result of that error will plague employment law for years
to come.
VII. CONCLUSION

We live in an age in which all but the most proper behavior between
individuals is viewed, at least in some circles, as legally actionable.
Particularly in the work setting, members of different groups often interact
in a stilted way for fear they may be disciplined, discharged, or even sued
for the most innocuous remark to a co-worker or subordinate. Simply
repeating the punch line from a sit-coin, asking for a date, or even going
so far as making a proposition for sex is, without more, not the type of
activity which should subject people and corporations to civil liability.
Rather, such actions are the natural and expected (though not always "Grated") interaction between human beings working together. Nevertheless,
the objects of such attention quite often resort to the civil justice system
rather than a simple request that the offender stop his or her conduct. This
is good for the lawyers, but bad for America. It is with that background that
Oncale was decided.
Far from experiencing just bawdy office humor or a legitimate request
for after-work social interaction, Mr. Oncale was the subject of a blatant
sexual battery. Out of propriety, the facts will not be recited again here, but
it is no exaggeration to say this gentleman would have been well within his
right to have called the police as opposed to simply reporting the situation
to a company representative on the oil rig. A call to law enforcement
would have been most appropriate; as would have been a call to a lawyer
relying on a theory other than Title VII. This is simply because Title VII
was not intended to redress wrongs perpetrated between male co-workers,
particularly in the factual setting of Oncale. Justice Scalia, with the
unanimous backing of the Supreme Court, however, missed an opportunity
to differentiate between wildly inappropriate behavior of a criminal nature
and those actions properly cognizable under Title VII. While there is no
way to say with any certainty, it seems likely the United States Supreme

147. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
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Court was caught up in the wave of political correctness and social probity
which have swamped the original intent of Title VIL
Did the individual defendants in Oncale engage in completely
reprehensible behavior? Yes. Should the Plaintiff recover monetarily for
those deeds? Yes, against both the individuals and the employer. Should
the gravamen of that claim be Title VII? Absolutely not! The Oncale
decision represents our highest Court trying to have it both ways. On the
one hand, Justice Scalia writes about the context in which human beings
interact, noting the differences between men and women and pleading
heartily that this latest decision does not represent a workplace code of
conduct. However, as Shakespeare would have said, "The justice] protests
too much, me thinks. ' 4 As in Hamlet, Justice Scalia's own protestations
about what the opinion is not reveal what it truly is.
Rather than representing an explanation and necessary restriction on
Title VIL Oncale stands for the proposition that objectively reprehensible
talk and actions between members of the same gender, even in a singlegender setting, can lead to Title VII liability. Though there is no way to tell
if the Oncale bad guys would have behaved differently towards women
(because there were no women around to bear the brunt of their
sophomoric, at best, behavior), there is factually and logistically no way to
say these men behaved as they did toward Oncale because of his gender.
Without that critical component, this new decision is little more than the
Supreme Court giving the federal judiciary the right to clean out this
defendant's wallet where it would be more appropriate to wash out its
employees' mouths with soap.

148. WiLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc.2.
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